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[Crim. No. 6398.

In Bank.

Oct. 30,1959.]

In re JAMES DOMINICK SGRO, on Habeas Corpus.

Ll1 Criminal Law-Plea-How Put in-Guilty-Right

(J

to Counsel.
-The evidence supported a referee's finding that a 19-year-old
defendant understood his right to counsel and freely waived
it when he pleaded guilty of burglary "here he had been represented by a court-appointed attorney on a previous charge of
felony, he was twice informed by a police officer of his right
. to be represented by counsel on this charge, he was assisted
in preparing an affidavit of indigency so that counsel could be
appointed for him, the order of appointment was vacated at
defendant's request at the preliminary examination, at which
time the court asked him whether he wished to proceed without an attorney, to which he replied, "Yes," where on direct
examination the prosecutor asked defendant whether he was
sware that he had a right to be represented by counsel at all
Itages of the proceedings and that if he did not have funds
to engage an attorney the court would appoint one for him,
to which defendant answered affirmatively and stated that he
wished to waive his right to counsel and proceed without representation, and where subsequently, at his arraignment in the
superior court, defendant again expressly waived his right to
be represented by an attorney and declined the court's offer
to appoint counsel for him.

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 244; Am.Jur., Criminal Law,
§§ 257,269 et seq.
iricK. Dig. Reference: [1] Criminal Law, § 202.
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James Dominick Sgro, in pro. per., and Edward Molkenbuhr, Jr., under appointment by the Supreme Court, for
Petitioner.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, and Arlo E. Smith, Deputy
Attorney General, for Respondent.

o

TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner is held under a jUdgment of conviction entered on his plea of guilty of burglary (Pen. Code,
§ 459), which the court found to be in the second degree. In
his petition in propria persona for a writ of habeas corpus
petitioner charges that his conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel.
Petitioner asserts that he was 19 years of age at the time
he was charged with the commission of the burglary for which
he is now imprisoned; that he appeared in court without
counsel and entered a plea of guilty; that he was not asked
by the court if he had counsel, or if he wished to be represented
by counsel at this proceeding or at any other time; and that
he did not understand or freely waive his constitutional right
to counsel. We issued an order to show cause why the writ
should not be granted and appointed a referee to take evidence
and make findings. The referee found that petitioner "did
understand his right to counsel and freely waived it whell
he pleaded guilty on July 3, 1958." Petitioner has filed objections to these findings.
[1] After a review of the proceedings below, we have
concluded that the findings of the referee are correct and that
therefore the writ should not issue. The record discloses that
petitioner had been represented by a court-appointed attorney
upon a previous charge of felony; that he was twice informed
by a police officer of his right to be represented by counsel 011
this charge; and that he was assisted in' prepaHng an affidavit
of indigency so that counsel could be appointed for him. The
municipal court appointed counsel for petitioner, but the ordt·r
of appointment was vacated at petitioner's request at the
preliminary examination on July 1, 1958. At that time th",
court asked petitioner whether he wished to proceed without
an attorney, to which he replied. "Yes;" On direct examination the deputy district attorney a~ked petitioner whether he
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was aware that he had a right to be represented by counsel
at all stages of the proceedings and that if he did not have
funds to engage an attorney the court would appoint one
for him. Petitioner answered affirmatively and stated that he
wished to waive his right to counsel and proceed without
representation. Subsequently, at his arraignment in the superior court, petitioner again expressly waived his right to be
represented by an attorney, and declined the court's offer
to appoint counsel for him. The referee noted that petitioner's
demeanor was alert, that under examination his answers were
prompt and responsive, and that he had the mental capacity
to understand the information repeatedly given him concerning his rights. There is therefore ample evidence to support
thc conclusion that despite his being only 19 years of age
petitioner understood his right to counsel and the consequences
of its waiver.
No credible evidence was presented by petitioner to substantiate his claim that the right was not freely waived. At
both the preliminary examination and the arraignment, petitioner stated that he was acting of his own free will, without
promises of any kind, and these statements are confirmed by
the testimony of police officers and the <1eputy district attorney. Although petitioner now asserts that he had been
promised probation if he pleaded guilty, at his arraignment
he expressly declined to apply for probation.
Since we have found that petitioner freely and intelligently
waived his right to counsel (see In re Mart·illez, ante, p. 808
[345 P.2d 449]), the order to show cause is discharged and
the writ is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J., and
'Vhite, J., concurred.
PETERS, J.-I dissent.
This case is not, fundamentally, different from In re
.llnrUncz, ante, p. 808 [345 P.2d 449], tlJis day decided.
I dissent on the same grounds set forth in my dissent to that
opinion.
In this case, upon proper request, the municipal court
appointed an attorney for the aecllsed. IJater, at the preliminary hearing, the accused appeared without bis attornf'.v
who had 11I)t been notified of his appoiutmellt. 'l'he court allll
prosecutor knew that an attorney had bcen requested and
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appointed. The accused requcsted that thc appointment be
vacated. The court vacated thc appointment.
Once an attorney has been properly appointed he caullot
be removed from the case except as provided ill sections 284
and 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The COUl"t obviously
knew that some action had to be takcn because it entered a
vacating order. If the attorney had been removed as provided
in those sections, then, before a plea of' guilty could be accepted, the provisions of section 1018 of the Penal Code had
to be complied with. They were not.
As pointed out in my dissent in the Martinez case, the
three code sections constitute a proper implementation by
the Legislature of the constitutional right to counsel. Thus
they are integral parts of the constitutional right. COllstitutional rights, certainly such a basic one, as the right to
counsel, may not be impaired with impunity. This petitioner
was denied his constitutional rights, and for that r('aSOll the
writ of habeas corpus, in my opinion, should issul'.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied November 25, 1959. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the application should be granted.
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